By Campbell Craig
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Extra info for Destroying the Village -Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War
Officials were not worried about purposeful Soviet military aggression. " Note 22: November 18, 1949 draft memorandum from Kennan to Acheson, FRUS 1 (1949): 586. Note 23: An excerpt from this paper is printed in FRUS 1 (1950): 22–44. " (p. 22n) Kennan discusses this paper in his Memoirs, pp. 471–76. On Kennan’s valedictory also see Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 79–83. Note 24: FRUS 1 (1950) p. 39. , p. 164 Note 26: January 31, 1950 message from Truman to Acheson, FRUS 1 (1950): 141–42.
24 Second, and for the longer run, by clearly making the threat of nuclear war the basis of American Cold War policy, Eisenhower and Dulles forced themselves to consider thermonuclear war. By skirting the question of how the United States would wage all-out war, and by emphasizing conventional and atomic forms of deterrence, NSC–68 had allowed Truman and his advisers to avoid thinking about this difficult problem. This was not possible for Eisenhower or Dulles—the price of the New Look was having explicitly to face the prospect of a thermonuclear World War III.
39. , p. 164 Note 26: January 31, 1950 message from Truman to Acheson, FRUS 1 (1950): 141–42. This directive was adapted from a recommendation given to Truman by the Acheson/Lilienthal/Johnson special committee. Note 27: A standard argument regarding NSC–68 (Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 91–109) holds that Nitze expanded containment qualitatively beyond the basic realist formula provided by Kennan in 1946 and 1947. Other historians—for example, Walter Hixson, George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p.