By Phillip S. Meilinger
Ever because the US military obtained its first "aeroplane" in 1909, debates have raged over the application, effectiveness, potency, legality, or even the morality of airpower and strategic bombing. regrettably, a lot of this controversy has been coloured by way of accusations, misconceptions, inaccuracies, myths, and easy untruths. If airpower wishes criticizing --- and definitely there are occasions whilst feedback is suitable --- it needs to be in response to exact details. In Airpower: Myths and evidence, Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, retired, increases issues and counterpoints that try and transparent away a number of the detritus that obscures the topic, hence permitting extra proficient debate at the actual matters relating airpower and strategic bombing and giving our political and army leaders a greater foundation on which to shape judgements in destiny conflicts.
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Extra info for Airpower: Myths and Facts
Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000), 122, 156. 11. David T. , World War II in Europe: An Encyclopedia, vol. 1 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1999), 625. * In truth, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) reported that “bombing appreciably affected the German will to resist. Its main psychological effects were defeatism, fear, hopelessness, fatalism, and apathy. It did little to stiffen resistance through the arousing of aggressive emotions of hate and anger. War weariness, willingness to surrender, loss of hope in German victory, distrust of leaders, feelings of disunity, *See, for example, Thomas R.
Even so, the supposed increase in fighter production is suspect. Large discrepancies existed between the number of fighters allegedly produced and the number actually employed by the Luftwaffe. 8 Only six days after the landings, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the combined chiefs of staff thought the air situation safe enough that they actually visited the beachhead. At the same time, Hitler spent more and more time in bunkers to avoid Allied bombs. 10 Essentially, the Luftwaffe had been eliminated as a threat to the Allied invasion, despite what the production figures allegedly illustrated.
10. One P-47 pilot stated that he flew 70 combat missions with the Ninth Air Force between July 1944 and the end of the war but saw an enemy aircraft on only one mission. Robert V. : Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000), 122, 156. 11. David T. , World War II in Europe: An Encyclopedia, vol. 1 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1999), 625. * In truth, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) reported that “bombing appreciably affected the German will to resist. Its main psychological effects were defeatism, fear, hopelessness, fatalism, and apathy.